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ones, UNCTAD moved quickly and rapidly away to
viewing the flows in more sophisticated analytical
frameworks and examining novel questions such as
tax policy responses to the phenomenon. It was an
active partner therefore in the intellectual and policy
shifts in the 1970s in the kinds of issues that were raised
and analysed regarding outflows of skilled people
from the developing countries.2
This is also an occasion for me to pay tribute to Raul
Prebisch, the first Secretary-General, whom we must
celebrate as much as UNCTAD. For he shaped
UNCTAD splendidly in its formative stages. He was
open to ideas, consulted extensively even with
economists who were opposed to his viewpoints, and
drew his and UNCTAD's strength from this openness
of intellect and the ability to combine economic
excellence with his dedicated pursuit of economic and
social progress in the developing countries. I recall the
early Expert Groups, having served on one myself in
1962 on 'Trade Liberalisation Among Developing
Countries' (now known as 'South-South' trade, and
discussed even within UNCTAD without memory of,
and profit from, the early UNCTAD work on the
subject). Here, economists eminent in their field of
expertise, rather than representatives selling political
viewpoints on which they were instructed, would come
together for three weeks, and remain closeted until
they had produced a first-rate document. Those
traditions, reflecting Prebisch's serious, acute and
committed approach to his responsibilities, are a
precious memory to those of my generation who
witnessed the birth of UNCTAD and gave their
energies to its early efforts.
II. The Evolution of the Trading System:
Multilateralism versus Unilateralism and
Regionalism
The world trading system is characterised by two
opposing trends. On the one hand, there is the ongoing
effort at the Uruguay Round to bring new disciplines
to old sectors (e.g. textiles), and old disciplines to new
sectors (e.g. services and agriculture). And indeed the
effort is wider still, extending to 'non-trade' items that
were hitherto not within the province of GATT in any
2 Titis work was carried out at UNC'I'AD under the direction of Dr
Surendra Paid and drew upon distinguished economists and
lawyers from around tite world.
I. Introduction
The 25th Anniversary of the founding of UNCTAD is
an occasion to remember, not for its failures, which it
shares inevitably with every international organisation
that is set up to address complex economic issues that
concern developing countries with diverse constraints
and objectives, but for its successes, which have been
unduly neglected.
Here, I shall recount only three of the many
intellectual accomplishments focusing on the early
lead that UNCTAD has provided on questions that
have attracted academic attention and invited policy
redress in national and international fora.
As an international trade economist, I must recall
the fact that the question of value-added protection, or
effective protection as we now call it, came up
repeatedly at the UNCTAD in the 1960s as developing
country spokesmen focused on escalation in tariff
structures and on the distorting incentives they
provided to shift processing towards the developed
countries. Now part of conventional wisdom, this was
much less so when UNCTAD addressed the issue.
Again, while the US-led demand to extend GATT
trade discipline to services has focused attention on
services since the early l980s, and the Uruguay Round
is seized with the issue, it is not widely known that
UNCTAD was the pioneer in dealing with services as a
trade and as a developmental issue. The early and
prior role of UNCTAD in services was brought home
to me when I was invited to give the annual Geneva
Lecture of the International Insurance Association
some years ago. Dr Giarini, who was my host, told me
how he had told a distinguished member of the
Association that I was to talk about Trade in Services
as the matter was now actively under consideration at
the GATT. His reaction: 'Mmmm. GATT. What is it?
Is it some sort of UNCTAD?'
Finally,! must also mention the outstanding work
done at UNCTAD in relation to skilled migration
from the developing countries and policy responses
thereto. While the early focus was on conceptually
weak and hopelessly misleading estimates of the costs
to developing countries and the gains to the developed
Sincere thanks are due to IJNCTA D. for permission to print the test
of this Keynote Speech, delivered at the Suosuposium for the 25th
Anniversary of UNCTAD, Geneva. 18-19 September 1989.
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serious way: e.g. trade-related investment measures
(TRIMS) and intellectual property issues.3
Contrasting with this multilateral exercise are a series
of adverse trends in the trade policies of two major
areas: the European Community and the United
States. Both were characterised during the 1980s by an
outbreak of protectionism in the shape of both 'high-
track' measures - such as voluntary export restraints
(VERs), orderly marketing arrangements (OMAs) and
other trade-restraining arrangements - and 'low-
track' capture by protectionists of the countervailing
duty (CVD) and anti-dumping (AD) provisions of the
'fair trade' laws.4
But, equally disturbing are two other aspects of their
recent trade policies:
First, there is the recent turn in US trade policy
towards unilateralism. Unilateralism relates to three
different tendencies in current US policy: (i) seeking
unilateral trade concessions from others; (ii) refusing
to submit oneself, as under GATT, to the same
adjudication procedures in determining violations of
one's trade rights that one uses against others; and (iii)
defining new 'unfair trade' practices, and hence new
trading rights and disciplines, through unilateral
specification and threatened punishment for non-
compliance rather than by negotiated treaty.
Such unilateralism, reflected in the strengthened
Section 301 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act and in the ensuing 'Super-301'
actions of 25th May 1989 against Japañ, India and
Brazil, marks a departure from key principles that the
GATT reflects: especially that trade rights be defined
by and be available toall GATT members, and that
each member subjects itself to the same adjudication
and settlement procedures (in regard to alleged
violations of trade rights) as it imposes on others.
It also marks a departure from the conventional
GATT approach of 'first difference' reciprocity in
trading trade concessions. In place of 'balanced',
mutual reductions of trade barriers, as in the many
Rounds of postwar trade negotiations, the US appears
to have now embraced a novel method of moving to
freer trade: ask others to liberalise, using not the
persuasion provided by the inducement of one's own
trade concessions to do so, but the threat to suspend
one's trading obligations if the demands are not met.
Second, the conjunction of Europe 1992 and the US-
Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has created the
distinct expectation that the world trading system is
moving towards regional blocs, as distinct from
GATT-wide multilateralism. The FTA represents a
reversal of a longstanding refusal by the US to use
Article XXIV of GATT to pursue regional initiatives.
These do have trade aspects. But so does the dru trade which we
have not put within the GATTs purview.
For discussion of these recent trends, see Bhagwati [1985, Ch 31
How seriously are these two changes to be regarded?
Since the United States is still the major force in the
world economy, the question is pertinent. Especially
because it seems that if the ability or willingness of the
US to provide leadership in support of multilateralism
is weakening, the willingness of the EC or,
particularly, Japan to provide it instead is not in
evidence. We may thus be entering a period of
uncertainty and difficulty that may threaten the liberal
trading system that has operated, however imperfectly,
around the GATT.
On unilateralism, my assessment is that the national
mood in America, which constrains the US
Administration, is one that promotes unilateralism
and the use of the crowbar. This mood is likely to
persist, because it rests on some basic perceptions
which have taken firm root in Congress.
There are many reasons why several Americans feel
that America deserves to get something for nothing in
trade concessions today. Vis-a-vis Japan, in particular,
the feeling derives from notions such as that (i) Japan
is not honouring its past obligations, i.e. that it is
'cheating', so that its imports are not commensurate
with its trade concessions, and so it should do more to
accept imports: unilateral trade concessions would
only bring Japan's current import performance up to
levels implied by earlier obligations; (ii) Japan is
running a large and persistent surplus and therefore
must undertake more trade liberalisation; and
(iii) Japan is 'different', with different tastes and
institutions and therefore we misjudged how little its
earlier trade concessions would increase our exports,
so that we gave away too much and therefore we can
ask Japan, ex post, to do more.5
In my judgement, none of these and other arguments is
compelling on examination; but they are politically
potent and will endure. But the most plausible
argument for the US making unilateral demands for
trade liberalisation relates to Special & Differential
(S & D) treatment for developing countries.
The contention, which I call the 'coming-of-age'
argument, is that these developing countries, chiefly
South Korea and Taiwan, have had a free lunch so far,
having been given S & D treatment at the GATT,
thanks to which they could use tariffs and other trade
barriers but profited from the general reductions in
trade barriers of the developed countries in the
postwar period because of unconditional most
favoured nation (MFN) treatment. In terms of 'first
difference' reciprocity, these countries secured
unbalanced trade concessions in their favour, making
overall access to their markets significantly less than
their access to the markets of the developed countries.
For those countries, such as South Korea and Taiwan,
'1 have listed more arguments. and assessed their merits, in a recent
paper, 'US trade policy today' Columbia University Conference on
US Trade Policy, 9 September 1989.
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which have come of age in terms of both exports and
per capita incomes, this 'affirmative action' is no
longer justified. They must now assume their full
obligations as GATT members, as the developed
countries do. This means, of course, that they must
unilaterally lower trade barriers or, what is the same
thing, provide greater concessions in future
negotiations than they can get.
Within the logic of reciprocity, the argument is well
taken. S & D treatment for the developing countries
was never granted by other GATT members as a
permanent 'benefit', simply because GATT is
premised on the assumption of symmetrical rights and
obligations and on first-difference reciprocity as a
method of negotiation to reduce barriers, and
therefore any exemption from the symmetrical
obligations has to be legitimated. For developing
countries, this legitimacy was provided by infant-
industry and balance-of-payments arguments (as
refected in Article XVIII(b), especially). But the
developmental status of some developing countries
has changed; and the theoretical support for
exempting any of them from the obligations of open
market access on grounds such as balance-of-payments
has also waned.6 On both grounds, the 'coming-of-
age' argument for asking unilateral concessions from
South Korea and Taiwan has acquired cogency, not
just within the United States. (I return below to the
broader question of S & D generally in the context of
how developing countries should fit into the trading
system today.)
If one really believes that one should get something for
nothing in trade concessions, then it follows that the
GATT method of negotiations where trade concessions
are traded is not exactly appropriate to one's needs.
Indeed, one-way or unbalanced trade concessions can
generally be secured only by methods that permit the
use of one's power. By putting access to one's large
market at risk, by threatening tariff retaliation, a
powerful country can indeed then demand more
successfully such unbalanced, or effectively one-way
or unilateral, trade concessions. The 301 and Super-
301 techniques which the 1988 Trade Act has now
mandated are therefore the natural instrumentalities
of a powerful trading nation that feels aggrieved and
wants unilateral trade concessions from others.
The shift to such aggressive unilateralism has further
been promoted by new export interests. For
multinationals with global reach, the use of national
power to 'open foreign markets' with the use of Super-
301 actions is welcome because it permits them to
secure privileged access for themselves to these foreign
markets. Opening foreign markets within the GATT
framework would be on a multilateral, MFN basis.
Unilateral concessions, secured by threats, are more
On these questions, see the splendid analysis by Wolf [1987] and
Anjaria [1987].
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susceptible instead to the targeted country satisfying
the demands for opening markets by diverting imports
from less powerful countries to the powerful country
that is making the demands. The US Administration is
now aware of these dangers: but they persist inevitably
in the 301 approach and, indeed, are a major cause of
its appeal to the export lobbies in the country that
provides the political pressure for its use.
But it is not just these interests that drive the
unilateralism embodied in 301 type actions today.
There is also ideology as provided by economic
theory. The story here is complicated but interesting.
I should first remind my friends from the developing
countries that the older trade theorists such as myself,
who developed the post-war theory of commercial
policy, were not anti-interventionists but rather
appropriate-interventionists'. Through the 1 960s and
1970s, theorists such as myself and Harry Johnson,
among others, clarified the nature of appropriate
intervention to meet several diverse forms of market
failure ('distortions'). We were also the pioneers in
shifting attention away from the narrow-minded
pursuit of goods-based utilitarianism towards incor-
poration of so-called 'non-economic' objectives into
the conventional utility functions and devising
appropriate interventions to achieve such objectives.
The popular conception that our scientific work urged
laissez faire or even unmitigated free trade, no matter
what, is a conclusion based on ignorance: a quality
that is unfortunately manifest everywhere. It has been
given yet further currency by unpersuasive and
unfortunate recent arguments from some younger
trade theorists that free trade was the theory that was
advanced as 'always right' until imperfect competition
in product markets began to be fashioned in trade-
theory analyses (to the neglect of the vast variety of
other market imperfections analysed by trade
theorists in the 1960s and 1970s).
As it happens, the economists in the developing
countries who have fallen prey to these views in the
wrong belief that the 'new' theories 'finally' justify
their own love of protection and will therefore enable
them to practise it in peace, are in for a surprise. For
the proponents of 'strategic trade theory' (based on
imperfect competition models) equally lend them-
selves to unilateralism in United States policy, not just
theoretically, but also through their recent willingness
to be used by the lobbying interests that push for the
aggressive policies designed to kick open the trade
barriers of the foreign countries, developing countries
included. In short, these economists in the developing
countries will find that their beloved protection,
instead of being preserved, may well be imperiled by
their friends among the 'new' trade theorists!
The earlier trade theorists, such as myself, lectured
to the developing countries, and to all others as well,
that knee-jerk protectionism to fix market failures of
all kinds was wrong, and that the intervention had to
be designed so as to fix the market failure
appropriately through domestic instruments when
necessary. When it came to the GATT, we were
supporters of this multilateral institution in the belief
that these institutions protect the weak against the
strong.
But take the younger trade theorists, with their
exclusive emphasis on strategic trade policy (i.e.
oligopoly models showing that tariffs can shift some
excess profits in such industries towards oneself).
These theories concentrate on the fact that predatory
action can be profitable when it comes to trade policy.
If that is so, it is easy to see that the mighty will see in
this possibility the pretext, if not the justification, to
flex their muscles, but the weak cannot do so. This
theory adds just one more wrinkle to the conventional
post-war theory of commercial policy. But it lends
itself to capture by the strong, to be used against the
weak.
Thus, my developing country friends will find that the
'new' arguments become the handmaiden of aggressive
bashing of the very trade barriers that they thought the
new theories would justify. The targetting of Brazil
and India on 25th May by the Super-301 actions of the
United States should have startled these friends of
mine into better sense more than anything I might say.
And, as for the GATT and multilateralism, some of
the more energetic of the proponents of strategic trade
theory have displayed little hesitiation in attacking the
GATT and supporting aggressive unilateralism,
unmindful of the costs to the trading system or the
interests of the weak. Nor have the MNCs failed to
co-opt them into writing to support these positions
which justify the general lobbying positions of much
of the influential corporate sector in America today.7
This combination of interests and academics makes
the pursuit of aggressive unilateralism by the United
States a more potent force for us to contemplate than
would either factor by itself.
Regionalism: The growth of regionalism is a different
matter, where I believe that one should not infer a
trend from just two observations: Europe 1992 and the
FTA.
First, a historical note. In the 1960s, when the
European Community (EC) had led to the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) and, around the world,
'Cf. two recent glossy pamphlets, financed and then widely
circulated by Eastman Kodak in Rochester. New York, and written
by respectable economists identified prominently as the authors
advocating pro-manufacturing positions. erroenouslv attacking the
GATT. and advocating trade-policy options such as aggressive
bilateralism. This seems to me to represent a new turning point in
the relationship between academic economists and the mutti-
nationals, going well beyond the consulting and judicial testifying
which have also proliferated in recent years among academics. and
raises issues concerning the credibility of the profession.
regional blocs and groupings such as Latin American
Free Trade Area (North Atlantic) being proposed, we
did not have an articulate Lester Thurow telling us
that the GATT was dead and the world was
fragmenting into regional blocs. But we did have many
who thought, and feared, likewise. Well, the 'trend'
never took root. It may not this time around either:
serious analysts of US trade policy are among the
sceptics.
Second, it must be recognised that the conjunction of
Europe 1992 and the ETA is largely fortuitous. The
two were prompted by wholly different motivations
and historical circumstance. The appeal in the US of
the FTA was that, politically, it was a dramatic, trade-
expanding move in public perception, providing an
offset to the growing political momentum for
protectionism.
Virtue was also found in the fact that, as part of the
ETA, progress was made in negotiating trade in
services. This too was seen as imparting momentum,
not merely by example but also by implied threat (that
the US, if necessary, would move ahead with 'like-
minded' nations on services if the GATT talks failed),
to the progress of the multilateral negotiations on
services at the Uruguay Round.
An indisputable merit of the ETA also was the
inclusion, at Canadian initiative and insistence, of a
bi-national procedure for reviewing national US 'unfair
trade' adjudications. In a world where nations
increasingly fling charges of unfair trade at one
another, the old fashioned ways of doing business in
these matters are getting rapidly obsolete. The
traditional way, where (say) Americans complain, and
American institutions judge, much like Judge Dee of
medieval China who acted as the prosecutor and the
judge, makes little sense in today's world. Increasingly,
we need to settle such complaints by neutral, impartial
procedures as at the GATT for dispute settlement. The
FTA made a real contribution in that direction,
paving the way for future models of institutional
change designed to handle better and contain the
damage from the obsessions with unfair trade.
By contrast, Europe 1992 was prompted by the wholly
different goal of making the Common Market
commoner, taking the last, difficult, almost
insuperable, steps towards political and economic
unification that the Treaty of Rome had already
adopted as its objective.
But the coincidence of these two dramatic events, plus
the jaundiced view of the GATT on Capitol Hill and
the indifference to the GATT-illegality of the actions
contemplated under the new 301 provisions of the
1988 Trade Act, suggested to many abroad that,
despite professions to the contrary from the
Administration and its efforts at the Uruguay Round,
the American commitment to multilateralism had
ended. Regionalism had arrived. The world was
Il
fragmenting into trading blocs.
Unfortunately, this influence of a trend from two
observations can be self-fulfilling. It has tended to
produce a sense in the Far East, for instance, that a
Japan-centred regional bloc there may be necessary in
a bloc-infested world. The effect would surely be to
undermine the energies spent on making the Uruguay
Round successful, with its vast agenda of remaking
GATT to suit the needs of the modern world.
In my view, it is absolutely imperative for the United
States to reject the temptation therefore to move
towards further such regional arrangements, eschewing
the temptation to strike special deals with Mexico and
others, so as to convey a clear message that the FTA
was a special event, much like the European
unification was and Europe 1992, its culmination, is.8
Here lies the greater wisdom, if less immediate profit.9
III. The Role of MNCs
The role of the multinationals as a major force in the
world trading system is now undeniable. I make only a
few, key observations that concern deeper issues.
Their role in containing overt import protectionism
has been considerable. The increased globalisation of
the world economy, with investments criss-crossing
the globe and leading to what I have called a 'spider's
web' phenomenon, has given rise finally to the growth
of interests with a stake in an open, freer trading
system. Reaction to severe import competition, with
growth of foreign investment, had become increasingly
not a one-way option, namely protection:
Schumpeterian firms had often responded by moving
abroad to cheaper locations. Now, with increased
investments everywhere, protection looks like a yet
worse alternative: if my protection leads to an
outbreak of protectionism elsewhere, the profits of
globalised corporations cannot but be jeopardised.
MNCs have therefore become an increasingly
important force against overt protection.'°
But the increased globalisation has also led to one
other effect, not altogether risk-free. The increased
tendency of MNCs to get into each other's hair, a
phenomenon that was noticed first by Stephen Hymer
in the 1970s and has been known as cross-investment,
has meant today that they have become increasingly
sensitive to the question whether they are playing on
'level fields', whether competition is 'truly fair' or
whether others have some artificial advantages that
make it unfairly difficult to compete in a cruel,
I reject therefore, not merely the economic logic, but also the policy
wisdom, of the recent Dornbusch-Kodak recommendations to
promote regional and bilateral arrangements because preferential
access over other exporting countries (whether efficient suppliers or
not) is one of the 'benefits' of such arrangements.
5¡ turn to the related issue of South-South trade in Section IV.
° For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Bhagwati [1988, Ch 4].
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competitive world. This tendency has become
pronounced in the United States in particular, since its
traded industries were long under pressure because of
serious dollar overvaluation, until the Plaza Agree-
ment started to reverse this situation. The effect has
been, as we know, the tendency to put everything on
the agenda of 'unfair trade', including the Japanese
housewife's buying habits, Japan's retail distribution
system, the European Community's ban on hormone-
fed beef, and the development of standards in the
Community's move to 1992, to take just a few
examples.
This is certainly a perilous road to go down. For, in the
ultimate analysis, one must be willing to let a number
of things be, as we used to. Ifwe start bringing into the
arena the kinds of questions I just outlined as ones
where the notion of 'unfair' trade is now to be applied,
we will wind up granting legitimacy to propositions
such as the following: if Bangladesh has cheap wages,
it must be because of its population policy (or rather,
lack thereof) and therefore the 'pauper labour'
argument for preventing its textile exports begins to be
legitimate. By condoning such extensions of the
'fairness' doctrine of international trade, governments
and economists (who pander to these notions) are
assisting in the breakdown of the notion that an open
trading system is possible, and profitable, among
nations with diverse preferences and institutions. It is
time for economists who see positive virtues in a freer
trading system to militate against these foolish notions
and dangerous tendencies: they obviously lead to
capture of the trading system by lobbies seeking their
narrow, sectional interests rather than the national
interest and the interest of an orderly and efficient
world trading system.
The role of multinationals in opening markets has a
positive value. Finally, we have a pressure group that
provides a countervailing force to the import
protectionists whose power in pluralistic societies we
have lamented since the time of Pareto. ° But there is a
downside here too. As I have hinted already,
multinational export lobbies can capture and misuse
the trade policy process as much as the import-
protectionist lobbies we are more familiar with. Thus,
these lobbies have tended increasingly, for example, to
use the 'balance of trade deficit' of the United States to
ask the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
for aggressive actions of the Super-301 variety, which
rebound to their immediate benefit but imperil the
GATT-centred trading system, just as (in developing
countries, especially) 'foreign exchange difficulties'
have been routinely cited to justify import protection.
When the Super-301 actions lead to trade diversion, in
Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs), as they have
° This benign influence of the new export lobbies was noted
independently by three recent studies: Bhagwati [1988]. Milner
[1988] and Destler and Odell [1987].
and are likely to, the result is what one can aptly call
'export protectionism', making the parallel with more
familiar VERs and import protectionism more
complete.
IV. The Developing Countries
I turn next to the developing countries and their role in
the world trading system today, in the light of what I
have said about the existing trends.
1. How does S & D for developing countries fit into
the system today? There are two aspects here. First,
there is S & D in their access to DC (developed
countries') markets. This relates, of course, to the
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). Second,
there is S & D in regard to access to their markets by
DCs and others. Here, the question is whether the
developing countries can be allowed to continue being
exempted from the discipline of the GATT through
virtually automatic use of Article XVIII(b), invoking
infant industry and balance-of-payments reasons to
regulate access to their markets much as they wish,
while they enjoy greater access to the markets of DCs.
I think that it is correct to say that there is by now
virtual unanimity that GSP did not do much for the
developing countries. Many academic studies confirm
this. Perhaps this was inevitable, since the concessions
made were not valuable; and those who believe that
trade concessions come (except for those who can
wield the crowbar) only when you offer some in
exchange, this outcome of the 'altruism-based' GSP is
not surprising. I should only add two observations.
First, the value of GSP has diminished as the tariff
levels have gone down since GSP was started. The
issue is of little practical relevance; it is not worth the
political input necessary to keep it going. For the least
developed countries, however, it may be worthwhile.
Second, the timing of its removal is worth considering,
even for the bigger, more developed countries. For
instance, removing GSP for Brazil and other indebted
countries effectively amounts to raising the tariff on
their exports: this is clearly the wrong sort of thing to
do at this juncture.
The more important issue is the question of reverse
market access to the developing countries. Here, as I
argued earlier, the case for a revision, or at least a more
stringent application of, Article XVIII(b), and the
removal of the S & D status for the highly-successful
developing countries such as South Korea and Japan,
is a relevant issue. 1 believe that such 'graduation' is
clearly called for and that, rather than object to it, the
developing countries should accept the principle of
graduation and bring South Korea and Taiwan, cap
and gown in hand, to the graduation ceremony.
GATT is an institution based on the notion of
symmetrical rights and obligations of all members,
except when there are strong grounds for 'affirmative
action'. No such grounds exist for the advanced NICs;
they should be taken off the list of those denying
market access despite GATT membership. In fact, the
modification of Article XVIII(b), or more stringent
and restrictive interpretation of it, would also help
nudge developing countries towards more open trade
policies that would only benefit them in the long run.
What attitude should they take on services? The
developing countries have been divided on this issue,
though most of them remain fearful of liberalisation in
service trade. I believe here that the gains to
developing countries from service liberalisation are
greater than was believed at first. I had long urged
them to join the negotiations instead of rejecting them
altogether; and I see that this has finally happened,
and that my recommendation that they match the
right of establishment with the right to enter (though,
not immigrate) in order to provide skilled, semi-skilled
and unskilled labour services has also been adopted.t2
Recently, I suggested with Andre Sapir (1989) that the
optimal way to proceed would be for the DCs to
undertake a services compact among themselves, since
many developing countries would continue to have
reservations in sectors such as banking and insurance
where they feel it is part of their infrastructure and
they are not prepared to take the consequences of a
rules-oriented liberalisation where they may 'lose-all'.
But, given these legitimate fears of the developing
countries, the developed countries should offer
unconditional MFN to the developing countries for a
defined period, of say 15-20 years, during which the
developing countries effectively enjoy rights but have
no obligations. Two provisOs would be added
however. As with Centrally Planned Economies
(CPEs) at the GATT, during the time of unconditional
MFN, the developing countries would undertake
quantity obligations: e.g. India would accept three
more banks annually. Second, at the end of the period,
the developing countries would have to accept 'rules'
obligations, reverting to conditional MFN and losing
their rights unless they accept symmetrical obligations.
This plan has the advantage that it would bring the
developing countries on board instead of leaving them
out, as some hardliners suggest; it would give them
time to familiarise themselves with the issues, while
accepting some obligations of a moderate and
containable type, and at the same time not give them
an indefinite 'free lunch'. This is a proposal for a
cooperative, moderate approach that seeks to bring
everyone into the fold.
What about intellectual property rights? Here
again, while my own view is that it is not really a
GATT-type issue but one of conflicting views of what
apppropriate patent rights ought to be and how to
2j wrote extensively on these issues over the last four years. including
in mv Genera Lecture, in The Economic Tunes (India), The World
Econo,ni and The World Ban/s Economic Reiieii.
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reconcile these differences, it is too late to raise the
issue in that form. But what developing countries can
do is to suggest that the matter be arranged among the
developed countries, allowing one another obligations
and rights as they wish, and that it might even be put
into the GATT in the form of a Code, but that it
should not apply, with GATT sanctions, to
developing countries unless these countries voluntarily
join the Code. In short, the opposition to having the
matter included in the GATT should be yielded; but
the right not to have the developing countries accept
new obligations if they do not wish to must be left
intact. Again, I think that matters of outright
cheating, as with counterfeiting trademarks and
products, should be treated as just that: and this
matter should be separated out firmly from the patents
issue, which is a matter where evidently different
viewpoints about desirable lengths of patent rights etc.
can he held, no matter what is asserted by the trade
negotiators from some of the OECD countries.
The question of dispute settlement is also evidently
an important one today. Let me explain. We know
that 'fair trade' mechanisms are continually being
misused in the Community and in the United States to
moderate the growth of imports. One way to get at the
problem would be to use the Uruguay Round to make
such misuse more difficult. But both recent EC
practice (studied splendidly by Brian Hindley and
Patrick Messerlin) and the 1988 US legislation (which
went in the other direction, to make the successful use
of CVD and AD mechanisms more easy) show that
this is not likely to be a practical route. An alternative
procedure, which does not solve the problem but can
still help, is to move towards the strengthening of the
GATT's dispute settlement mechanisms, increasing
their scope and efficiency, as a way of getting relatively
impartial, neutral adjudication procedures for
reviewing and settling the CVD, AD and other charges
levelled at foreign rivals. Since Japan and the Far
Eastern nations have run into these problems most,
they should provide the natural regional alignment of
forces that the developing countries can foster and ally
with in getting this moving at the Uruguay Round.
The developing countries ought to stay firmly
against the impeding shift of the safeguards clause
(Article XIX) to admitting selectivity in the targeting
of suppliers. It is well-known that this shift would
legitimate the principal way in which VERs and
OMAs are used to target suppliers whom it is
politically convenient to hit, rather than to reduce
imports in a non-discriminatory manner which
permits efficient suppliers to reduce exports less than
inefficient suppliers would have to. Since developing
countries have both low political clout and high
comparative advantage in many classes of goods
where Article XIX can be invoked, it is not in their
interest, nor in the interest of an efficient world trading
regime, to surrender Article XIX to the long-standing
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desire of the EC to sanctify the discriminatory use of
restraints, a desire that the United States (itself under
pressure from domestic pressure groups) is reported to
have yielded to in current negotiations. Here again,
the developing countries have an interest that
coincides with that of the Far Eastern nations, with
Japan as a natural ally.
Finally, let me comment on the question of South
South trade. This is an ongoing phenomenon and
policy objective; and it fits into the regional trend if
one believes that there is such a trend. But let me
express one thought on its siginificance as a policy
objective today.
During the 1960s, many including myself wrote and
argued in favour of preferential trade liberalisation
among developing countries, against the perspective
of widespread growth of import substitution behind
national trade barriers. We argued that the same
degree of import substitution in favour of manufactures
could be obtained at lower cost if the developing
countries lowered their trade barriers against one
another. In short, 'trade destruction' had occurred
already in the developing countries through national
trade barriers; the 'South-South' liberalisation would
simply lead to 'trade creation' now, reshuffling
industries among the developing countries and giving
more income to them therefrom. Ghana, for example,
was protecting and producing textiles and shoes, and
so was Nigeria. Both would now specialise, with
Ghana getting more textiles and Nigeria more shoes,
their respective levels of produced manufactures in
total would remain unchanged, but their income
would be higher. This logic was only reinforced by the
notion that economies of scale could not be obtained
in small, protected markets.
But the experience of outward orientation by the Far
Eastern countries, and the notion that if you want to
gain from trade, you must go ahead and integrate into
the world economy, and the observation that long-
standing import-substituting countries like India
produced a loner level of industrialisation than the
outward-oriented countries like South Korea in the
long-run, have all served to make the 1960s
argumentation in favour of South-South trade less
compelling.
The argument that the world economy is increasingly
protectionist and therefore no markets can be found
abroad, requiring therefore the growth of South-South
trade, goes back to Ragnar Nurkse in the 1950s and
has been revived recently by Arthur Lewis. But I see
little evidence for this, frankly. Protectionism today is
worse than before: the 1980s have been not exactly
heartwarming. Yet, as countless studies show, trade
has continued to grow, especially from the developing
countries, and the protectionist bark has been much
worse than its bite.'3 To rush, therefore, into
protectionist or regional alternatives, by succumbing
to this new export pessimism, would in myjudgement,
be a mistake.
V. Centrally Planned Economies
The Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs) are in an
astonishing and unpredictable stage of transition.
From 'fix-quantity' economic regimes, they are
moving with varying speeds to the embrace of markets
and price mechanisms in place of central planners and
bureaucrats, with 'fix-rule' economic regimes as their
targets. Their present course towards price reform has
been badly hurt by budgetary excess expenditures
combining with currency overhang to produce a
perilous 'repressed inflation' situation in the USSR,
where prices are still controlled, and a runaway
inflation in Poland, where prices have been freed.
Evidently, Mr Gorbachev is well-advised to get this
new macroeconomic problem under control before he
gets to price reform (i.e. price flexibility) for
microeconomic efficiency)4
As long as the CPEs are in this stage of transition, it is
difficult to see how they can be fully integrated into a
rules-based GATT system. For, while market access
to the OECD members of the GATT can be enjoyed
by them, how can a quantity-oriented system offer
comparable reverse market access, especially now that
such 'reciprocity' has become an extremely sensitive
issue? The GATT approach with the existing CPE
members has been to impose the obligation of a
certain overall import-expansion annually. Will the
OECD countries be willing to accept such obligations,
in lieu of market access to sell what you want subject
only to tariff bindings, from the larger and far more
important CPEs such as China and the Soviet Union?
My answer is: yes. For, the political willingness to
assist these countries in their integration into the
world economy certainly exists. The GATT should
certainly let China and the USSR in, imposing on them
the same quantity obligation for imports as it has done
on earlier CPE members. But the possibility of these
CPEs then undertaking reverse market-access
obligations, once they have price reforms and a
reasonably market-oriented economic regime in place,
must be formally discussed and built in at the time of
GATT admission so as to avoid down-the-road
bickering over the issue of balance of obligations.
° The reasons for this discrepancy have been discussed at length in
Bhagwati [1988. Ch 3] and draw on the work of many economists.
including Robert Baldwin and Anne Krueger.
° See the analysis by Desai [1989].
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